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Abstract The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
(IRAP) is frequently employed over other measures of so-
called implicit attitudes because it produces 4 independent
and Bnonrelative^ bias scores, thereby providing greater clar-
ity around what drives an effect. Indeed, studies have some-
times emphasized the procedural separation of the four trial
types by choosing to report only the results of a single, theo-
retically meaningful trial type. However, no research to date
has examined the degree to which performance on a given trial
type is impacted upon by other stimulus categories employed
within the task. The current study examined the extent to
which response biases toward Bwomen^ are influenced by
two different contrast categories: Bmen^ versus Binanimate
objects.^ Results indicated that greater dehumanization of
women was observed in the context of the latter relative to
the former category. The findings highlight that the IRAPmay
be described as a nonrelative, but not acontextual, measure of
brief and immediate relational responses.
Keywords Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure .
Relational Frame Theory . Dehumanization of women
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was
created as a way to assess natural verbal relations Bon the fly^
(Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010).
More specifically, the IRAP was designed to capture arbitrari-
ly applicable relational responding, which is posited by
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) to account for complex hu-
man behavior such as language and higher cognition (see
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2016, for detailed treatments). The IRAP has now
been employed in a wide range of contexts, including the
assessment of such relational responding in domains of both
clinical (see Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015, for a
meta-analysis) and social relevance (e.g., Drake et al., 2015;
Rönspies et al., 2015) as well as within basic science contexts
(e.g., Bortoloti & de Rose, 2012; Hughes, 2012; Hughes &
Barnes-Holmes, 2011).
Due to some procedural similarities with other measures
such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the IRAP is frequently referred
to or employed as a measure of so-called implicit attitudes
(e.g., Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012), a term that was
borrowed from cognitive psychology and refers to
Bautomatic^ behaviors that are emitted outside of awareness
or intentionality, under low volitional control and/or with high
cognitive efficiency (see De Houwer & Moors, 2010).
However, more recent work has emphasized that such refer-
ences to the IRAP as a measure of implicit attitudes were
heuristic in nature and has attempted to clarify the relationship
between the cognitive and functional-analytic approaches to
such behavioral phenomena (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De
Houwer, 2011; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012; see
Barnes-Holmes & Hussey, 2016; De Houwer, 2011, for
broader treatments of the relationship between functional-
analytic and cognitive psychology). In particular, we have
recently called for a refocusing on the IRAP’s original
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purpose: to aid a fine-grained functional-analysis of arbitrarily
applicable relational responding, as it is emitted (Barnes-
Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008; Hussey,
Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). The current study
represents one such effort to more clearly link this procedure
(the IRAP) to the theory from which it emerged (RFT).
Previous research using the IRAP often emphasized the
task’s ability to produce four separate bias scores (e.g.,
Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 2009;
Drake et al., 2015; Nicholson et al., 2013; Rönspies et al.,
2015) in contrast with the single overall bias score produced
by other Brelative^ measures (e.g., the IAT). Specifically,
whereas the IAT presents all four stimulus categories on each
trial and assesses the relative bias for one pattern of category
pairings over the other (e.g., categorizing Bself with life and
others with death^ vs. Bself with death and others with life^;
Nock et al., 2010), the IRAP presents individual stimulus
category pairings separately across trials and provides sepa-
rate bias scores for each (e.g., responding to Bself–life,^ Bself–
death,^ Bothers–life,^ and Bothers–death^ as being true vs.
false across blocks; Hussey, Barnes-Holmes, & Booth,
2016). Given that the two label categories and two target cat-
egories are never presented within the same trial, the trial types
can therefore be described as being procedurally independent
(e.g., a Bmen–objects^ trial on the IRAP contains no stimuli
from the categories Bwomen^ or Bhumans^).
However, despite this procedural property of the task, no
study has ever examinedwhether behavior emitted on one trial
type is influenced by the context set by the other trial types.
Given that the IRAP was created as a way to assess natural or
preexperimentally established verbal relations, it would seem
important to consider how contextual control over such verbal
behavior is exerted within the task itself. Indeed, previous
research has noted that Bthe precision of any particular IRAP
is fundamentally intertwined with the degree of experimental
control it is capable of applying to a given analytic question^
(Vahey, Boles, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010, p. 469). The current
study therefore sought to explore one such source of contex-
tual control within the task, as will now be expanded upon.
It is worth highlighting that the IRAP attempts to assess the
relative strength of relational responding in the presence of pairs
of stimulus classes that form the trial types. For example, the
left panel of Fig. 1 illustrates the trial types that are formed by
the combination of the four categories within a notional gender
IRAP: specifically, Bwomen–objects,^ Bwomen–human,^
Bmen–objects,^ and Bmen–human.^However, it should be not-
ed that these the trial types represent only a subset of all possible
combinations of the four categories. Specifically, trial types are
formed by the pairing of one label stimulus (e.g., women or
men) and one target stimulus (e.g., objects or human) and not
by pairing both label stimulus categories or both target stimulus
categories. That is, no Bmen–women^ trial type or Bobjects–
human^ trial types would be presented within a typical IRAP.
Nonetheless, we argue that it is likely that individuals’
preexperimental history of relating the two label categories
and/or two target categories will influence their behavior within
the task, even though these specific category pairings are not
presented, because the label–label and target–target relations
contribute to the broader context that is set within the measure.
In order the examine this, the current study manipulated what
can be referred to as the Bcontrast category^ (i.e., Bmen^ vs.
Binanimate objects^) in order to observe changes on the
Bcategory of interest^ (i.e., Bwomen^; see Fig. 1; see
Karpinski, 2004, for a similar approach).
We elected to employ dehumanization of women as our tar-
get domain (i.e., the denial of women’s subjectivity, individual-
ity, and/or ability to make choices; see Haslam, 2006;
Nussbaum, 1995). This domain appeared to be broadly suitable
for this research question given society’s mercurial attitudes to-
ward women. Specifically, previous research has shown that
there is a general tendency for women to be evaluated more
positively than men (e.g., as the more helpful, kind, and
empathic gender; see Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1991).
However, research elsewhere has demonstrated that women
Fig. 1 The stimulus categories
employed in the Gender and
Agency IRAPs. Note. Solid
arrows indicate trial types that
were common to both IRAPs (i.e.,
Bwomen–objects^ and Bwomen–
human^), whereas dashed arrows
indicate trial types that differed
between the two IRAPs (e.g.,
Bmen–human^ vs. Binanimate
objects–human^)
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are, simultaneously, all too often stereotyped as being ill-suited
to leadership in occupational settings (see Eagly &Karau, 2002,
for a review). Importantly, this difference in evaluations of wom-
en as either positive (e.g., Bempathic^) or negative (i.e., Bweak^)
has been shown to be highly context-dependent. That is, women
are problematically rendered by society as good caretakers and
bad leaders (e.g., Glick et al., 2004; see Rudman &Glick, 2001,
for an in-depth treatments of these issues). We therefore
attempted to utilize these differential, context-dependent evalu-
ations of women in the present study.
Stimulus categories were taken from a published study on
the implicit dehumanization of women (Rudman & Mescher,
2012) using the IAT. Two IRAPswere created that differed only
in their contrast category. The Gender IRAP employed stimuli
identical to those used by Rudman and Mescher (2012;
Experiment 2—i.e., women, men, objects, and human). A sec-
ond IRAP was created as a variant of the first: The Agency
IRAP replaced the category Bmen^ with Binanimate objects^
(see Table 1), based on the assumption that such everyday items
would be more strongly coordinated with Bobjects^ than the
Bwomen^ stimuli. In so doing, it sought to change the dimen-
sion of comparison from the gender of women (i.e., male vs.
female) to the agency of women (i.e., capable of independent
action, possessing mind and autonomy).
We hypothesized that Bwomen^ would be differentially
objectified and/or humanized by adult male participants across
the two IRAPs depending on the context in which these stim-
ulus classes were presented (i.e., Bmen^ vs. Binanimate
objects^), on the basis that the contrast categories were
intended to set a different context for responding to Bwomen^
within the task (i.e., gender vs. agency), and despite the fact
that the stimuli presented on those trial types were identical in
both cases. Given the novelty of this manipulation, and the
sometimes-counterintuitive nature of implicit biases within
socially sensitive domains, no specific hypotheses were made
about the direction of such effects. However, it is useful to
note that the specific form that such a difference might take is
less important here, given that we are primarily interested in
the more general argument that the contrast category influ-
ences responding to the category of interest. Should such dif-
ferences emerge, results would therefore demonstrate that the
contents of one categorywithin the IRAP provide a potentially
important source of contextual control over responding to the
other categories.
Method
Sample
The current study employed only participants who identified
as both male and heterosexual, in order to limit the number of
possible sources of contextual control over participants’ per-
formances. It is therefore useful to reemphasize here that the
current study employed the domain of dehumanization of
women but did not seek to explore this domain directly.
Forty-three male undergraduate students at the National
University of Ireland Maynooth (Mage =20.2, SD=2.0) were
recruited. Participants reported that they had completed be-
tween zero and 10 previous IRAPs (M = 1.4, SD = 2.2).
Inclusion criteria were fluent English (determined via self-re-
port), normal or corrected-to-normal vision, age 18–65 years,
full use of both hands, and self-identification as male and
heterosexual. No incentives were offered for participation.
Participants were randomly allocated to two groups in equal
numbers, each of which completed either a Gender IRAP or
an Agency IRAP (see below). Two self-report measures were
also employed in order to establish that the two groups dem-
onstrated equivalent levels of self-reported sexist attitudes.
Screening Measures
Attitudes Toward Women Scale The Attitudes Toward
Women Scale (ATWS) is a widely used measure of sexist
beliefs against women, which was used to compare the two
groups on their levels of self-reported sexist attitudes toward
women. This 25-item scale asks participants to respond to
statements which are either overtly sexist or egalitarian, such
as BThere should be a strict merit system in job appointment
and promotion without regard to sex^ and BIt is insulting to
women to have the ‘obey’ clause remain in the marriage
service^ (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973). It uses a 1
Table 1 Stimulus sets for the
Gender and Agency IRAPs Label stimuli Target stimuli Response options
Gender IRAP Agency IRAP
Women Men Women Inanimate objects Objects Human
Women Men Women Pencil Thing Human Similar Different
Woman Man Woman Fork Object Culture
Female Male Female Phone Tool Logic
Girl Guy Girl Keys Device Rational
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(strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree) response format.
Internal consistency was good in the current sample
(Cronbach’ss α= .72).
Likelihood to Sexually Harass Scale The Likelihood to
Sexually Harass Scale (LSH; Pryor, 1987) was used to com-
pare the two groups on their levels of self-reported sexual
objectification of women. This scale asks participants to read
10 paragraph-length depictions of specific scenarios and then
to respond to three items for each scenario. Each item asks the
participants to imagine that they are working in a specific
position of power (e.g., as an editor for a large publisher)
and that they have an interaction with a young, attractive,
and/or junior woman. Three questions are then presented that
ask whether the participant would be likely to show preferen-
tial bias for such a woman under three different conditions.
Subscale A does not specify a contingency for this preferential
bias (e.g., BWould you agree to read Betsy’s novel?^),
Subscale B specifies that it is in return for sexual favors
(e.g., BWould you agree to reading Betsy’s novel in exchange
for sexual favors?^), and Subscale C specifies that it is in
return for going on a date (e.g., BWould you ask Betsy to have
dinner with you the next night to discuss your reading her
novel?^). Each item employs a 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (very
likely) response scale. Internal consistency was excellent in
the current sample (α= .91).
Gender and Agency IRAPs
The IRAP’s structure has been detailed at length elsewhere
(e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010), thus, only
a brief outline of the specific task parameters employedwill be
provided here. The 2012 version of the IRAP program was
used. As previously stated, stimuli for the Gender IRAP were
drawn from Rudman and Mescher (2012), who used the cat-
egories Bwomen,^ Bmen,^ Bobjects,^ and Bhumans.^ In order
to create the second IRAP through the use of a contrast cate-
gory manipulation, the category Bmen^ was replaced with
Binanimate objects^ in the Agency IRAP (see Table 1). As
such, all stimuli were identical in both IRAPs other than those
in the contrast categories.
Each of the label and target stimuli presented in Table 1
was entered twice so that each block of trials on the IRAP
consisted of 32 trials and contained an equal number of the
four trial types (i.e., Gender IRAP: women–objects, women–
human, men–objects, and men–human; Agency IRAP: wom-
en–objects, women–human, inanimate objects–objects, and
inanimate objects–human). Participants were presented with
pairs of blocks, across which the required correct and incorrect
responses alternated. For example, in an BA^ block, when
presented with the stimuli Bwomen^ and Bhuman,^ partici-
pants were required to select one response option
(Bdifferent^), whereas in a BB^ block they were required to
select the other response option (Bsimilar^). Participants
responded using the Bd^ and Bk^ keys for the left and right
response option, respectively. The location of the response
options on screen alternated pseudorandomly between trials.
If participants emitted an incorrect response, a red BX^ ap-
peared, and a correct response was required to continue to
the next trial. If participants took more than 2000 ms to re-
spond on a given trial, a red B!^ appeared on screen. After each
trial, the screen cleared for 400 ms. Finally, the order of initial
presentation of the two blocks (A vs. B) was counterbalanced
between participants.
Participants were presented with up to four pairs of practice
blocks in which to attempt to meet the mastery criteria (i.e.,
accuracy ≥80 % and median latency ≤2000 ms on both blocks
within a pair) before being presented with exactly three pairs
of test blocks. If participants did not meet the mastery criteria
after four pairs of blocks, the task ended without presentation
of the test blocks. A responding rule was presented to partic-
ipants before each block. For the Gender IRAP, Rule A was
BWomen are objects and men are human^ and Rule B was
BWomen are human and men are objects.^ For the Agency
IRAP, Rule Awas BWomen are human and inanimate objects
are objects^ and Rule B was BWomen are objects and inani-
mate objects are human.^ After each block, participants were
presented with feedback about their accuracy and latency per-
formance on the previous block, as well as the accuracy and
latency mastery criteria.
Procedure
All experimental sessions were conducted one-to-one with a
trained researcher in an experimental cubicle. Written in-
formed consent was obtained from the participant prior to
participation, followed by a verbal assessment by the research-
er of all inclusion criteria. First, participants completed a de-
mographics questionnaire, followed by the ATWS and LSH.
They were then randomly assigned to the Gender IRAP and
Agency IRAP conditions in equal number.
Participants were verbally instructed in how to complete
the IRAP in several stages using a prewritten script. No addi-
tional written or on-screen instructions were provided. The
experimenter’s verbal instructions for both IRAPs contained
the following five key points, which were delivered before the
participant completed the first practice block. If a participant
indicated a lack of clarity around any point, as the researcher
worked through the script, and that point was reiterated and
clarified to the participant’s satisfaction. (1) For the Gender
IRAP, participants were instructed that they would be present-
ed with pairs of words related to Bwomen^ and Bmen^ as
being Bhuman^ or Bobjects^ and would be asked to respond
to those pairs as being Bsimilar^ or Bdifferent.^ Instructions
for the Agency IRAP referred to Binanimate objects^ instead
of Bmen.^ (2) They were informed that, unlike a questionnaire
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that asked for their subjective opinion, this behavioral task
simply required that they follow a rule, and this rule would
be provided on-screen. (3) Next, participants were instructed
that the rule would swap after each block, that there were only
two rules, and that they would be reminded of the rule for the
following block on-screen. (4) It was emphasized that they
were to initially go as slowly as they needed to get as many
trials as possible Bright^ according to the rule, and that they
would naturally become faster with practice. Furthermore, it
was emphasized to each participant that he must learn how to
respond accurately before learning to respond both quickly
and fluently. Once he had learned to be accurate, he should
then naturally learn to speed up.1 (5) Finally, participants were
then informed that they would complete pairs of practice
blocks until they learned to meet accuracy and speed criteria,
which would be presented at the end of the block. Once these
were met, they would then complete three pairs of test blocks.
Upon completion of the IRAP, participants were fully
debriefed and thanked for their time.
IRAP Data Processing
Performances on the IRAP were processed using common
practices (see Hussey, Thompson, McEnteggart, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015, for an article-length treat-
ment). Specifically, raw latencies on the IRAP test blocks
were converted into DIRAP scores in order to control for ex-
traneous variables such as age and responding speed. The
DIRAP score is a variant of Greenwald and colleagues’
(2003) D1 score in order to account for the IRAP’s four sep-
arate trial types (see Hussey, Thompson, et al., 2015). They
will hereafter be referred to asD scores for simplicity. In order
to calculate split-half reliability, separate D scores were also
calculated for odd and even trials by order of presentation.
This too was done separately for each trial type.
Next, D scores were excluded from the analysis based on
accuracy (accuracy ≤78 %) and latency (median latency
≥2000 ms) mastery criteria. This was done based on the fol-
lowing criteria: If a participant failed to maintain the criteria
on both blocks within a single test-block pair, it was excluded
from the calculation of their final D scores. If more than one
test-block pair was failed, that participant’s data were exclud-
ed from the analysis. The remaining test block pairs were
averaged to create four D scores, one for each trial type.
Two participants failed only one test block, and therefore the
data from that block pair were excluded from the calculation
of their finalD scores. One further participant failed more than
one test-block pair and therefore had his data excluded from
the analyses. No participants were excluded on the basis of
having failed to meet the mastery criteria in the practice
blocks. Forty-two participants therefore remained in the final
sample, 21 in each group. Finally, data from two of the trial
types (Bwomen–objects^ and Bwomen–human^) were
inverted (i.e., multiplied by −1). As such, positive D scores
may be interpreted as indicating a humanized or deobjectified
bias, and negativeD scoresmay be interpreted as indicating an
objectified or dehumanized bias.
Results
Demographics and Screening Measures
Independent t tests demonstrated that the Gender IRAP and
Agency IRAP groups did not differ in terms of their age
(p= .15), IRAP experience (p= .33), or scores on either the
ATWS (p= .67) or LSH (p= .75). While the two self-report
measures were specifically included only in order to assess the
equivalence of the two groups, it is worth noting that perfor-
mance on the IRAPs’ women–human or women–objects trial
types was not correlated with scores on the ATWS (rs=−.02
to .01) or LSH (rs = .10 to .32; differences between IRAP
conditions nonsignificant, ps > .29). This lack of correlation
with the LSH is consistent with previous research by
Rudman and Mescher (2012).
IRAPs
The current study was concerned with whether IRAP effects
would differ on trial types that presented exactly the same
stimuli but in which the context provided by the contrast cat-
egories (i.e., on the other trial types) differed. As such, only
the data from the Bwomen^ trial types (i.e., Bwomen–objects^
and Bwomen–human^) will be presented and analyzed here
(data analyses for the other trial types are available from the
first author upon request).
Mean D scores on both IRAPs are depicted in Fig. 2. As
predicted, the contrast category manipulation appeared to in-
fluence performances on one of the Bwomen^ trial types (i.e.,
Bwomen–human^). A 2×2 mixed within-between ANOVA
was conducted, with IRAP type (gender vs. agency) as the
between-participants variable and IRAP trial type (women–
objects vs. women–human) as the within-participants vari-
able. No main effects for IRAP type (p= .13) or trial type
(p= .11) were found, but the interaction was significant, F(1,
40) =4.10, p< .05. Follow-up independent t tests were then
used to explore differences on the individual trial types be-
tween the two IRAPs. Critically, a large and significant differ-
ence was found between the Bwomen–human^ trial type
across the two IRAPs, t(40)=2.27, p< .03, Hedges’ gs= .69.
Participants therefore dehumanized women differentially,
1 Previous articles have often emphasized both speed and accuracy to the
participant from the beginning of the task. More recent research, includ-
ing the present study, has sought to lower attrition rates by separating out
the accuracy and speed training aspects of the practice blocks.
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depending on whether Bwomen^ were contrasted with Bmen^
(i.e., along the dimension of gender: M=−.14, SD= .41) or
with Binanimate objects^ (i.e., along the dimension of agency:
M=−.41, SD= .33). However, no such differences emerged
for the Bwomen–objects^ trial type: participants objectified
women to a similar extent in the context of Bmen^
(M = −.16, SD = .35) and Beveryday objects^ (M = −.20,
SD= .42, p= .4).
Finally, split-half reliability was calculated using
Spearman-Brown correlations. This was found to be good
on both the Gender IRAP (women–human: ρ= .63; women–
objects: ρ= .77) and Agency IRAP (women–human: ρ= .79;
women–objects: ρ= .55). Fischer’s r-to-z tests revealed no
significant differences between the split-half reliability of ei-
ther trial type between IRAPs (all ps> .23).
Discussion
The Gender IRAP and Agency IRAP groups did not differ
in their age, IRAP experience, their sexist attitudes toward
women, or their level of self-reported likelihood to sexu-
ally harass women. Therefore, we concluded that any dif-
ferences between the two IRAPs’ Bwomen^ trial types
were likely due to the contrast category manipulation
(i.e., responding to Bwomen^ in the context of Bmen^
vs. Binanimate objects^). Critically, behavior on one of
the trial types of interest (i.e., women–human) was found
to differ based on the context provided by the contrast
category. As such, while the IRAP’s trial types are proce-
durally nonrelative, behavior within the task is not
acontextual. This is the first time that this form of contex-
tual control has been demonstrated within the IRAP.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that while the current
study manipulated the contents of a label stimulus catego-
ry between IRAPs, similar contrast category manipula-
tions could in principle be made to the IRAP’s target
stimulus categories (i.e., using a target category other than
Bhumans^ or Bobjects^ between IRAPs).
Research elsewhere using the IRAP has sometimes
targeted a single trial type (e.g., Nicholson et al., 2013).
However, the current results indicate that this must be done
in the knowledge that behavior within that trial type may be
influenced in important ways by the contents of the others.
Future research should therefore note that the theoretical rea-
sons for targeting specific trial types in an analysis should be
ideally supported by the contextual control brought to bear by
the contrast categories. This support could be either (a) theo-
retical, for example, by selecting optimal contrast categories
with considered reference to domain-relevant literature, or (b)
empirical, for example, by manipulating the contrast category
across IRAPs in order to attempt to target specific functions
(e.g., the gender vs. agency of women).
It is worth noting that the current research differs in a key
way to previous work on the role of the contrast category
within the IAT. Such work pivoted on two central questions:
(a) whether the necessity of a contrast category is inherently
problematic and, (b) if so, how to overcome it (e.g., De
Houwer, 2006; Houben & Wiers, 2006; Huijding, de Jong,
Wiers, & Verkooijen, 2005; Karpinski, 2004; Nosek,
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; Ostafin & Palfai, 2006; Palfai
& Ostafin, 2003; Pinter & Greenwald, 2005; Robinson,
Meier, Zetocha, & McCaul, 2005; Swanson, Rudman, &
Greenwald, 2001). Such research has—either tacitly or explic-
itly—treated the requirement of a contrast category as a pro-
cedural Bnuisance^ that serves to limit the ability to interpret
results. In contrast, the procedural separation of the IRAP’s
four trial types allows for a different narrative: specifically,
that the contrast category could instead be seen as a potentially
manipulable source of contextual control within the task.
Increased consideration of the choice or manipulation of the
IRAP’s contrast category may serve to enhance the precision
with which specific relational responses can be targeted, there-
by facilitating increasingly fine-grained analyses. Specifically,
Fig. 2 Performance on the
Gender and Agency IRAPs’
Bwomen^ trial types. Note.
Positive D scores represent
humanizing biases and negative
D scores represent dehumanizing
or objectifying biases. Error bars
represent standard errors
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while the majority of research to date using measures such as
the IRAP and IAT has operated under a common assumption
about the nature of the relation between stimulus categories
(i.e., that they should be Bobvious opposites^; see Robinson et
al., 2005, p. 208), the current research highlights the fact that
relatively less attention has been paid to which specific psy-
chological functions are specified by this relation (e.g., oppo-
site gender vs. opposite in agency), and how this influences
behavior within the task.
To take a concrete example, imagine a researcher was in-
terested in brief and immediate responses around self (cf.
Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, & De
Raedt, 2013). The stimulus categories BI am,^ Bpositive,^
and Bnegative^ might therefore be used to target self-related
evaluative responses. It should be noted, however, that previ-
ous research has argued that multiple aspects of self-
evaluation are important to psychological well-being, such
as evaluations of self relative to others (Beck, Rush, Shaw,
& Emery, 1979), and the relationship between conceptualized
self and idealized self (Foody, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2012). Different aspects of self-evaluations such as
these could therefore be brought to bear within the IRAP via
contrast categorymanipulations. Two IRAPs could be created,
with one targeting the distinction between evaluations of self
versus others (e.g., BI am^ vs. BOthers are^) and a second
targeting the conceptualized self versus idealized self (e.g.,
BI am^ vs. BI want to be^). Although the BI am–positive^ or
BI am–negative^ trial types would be identical across both
tasks, it is possible that differences would emerge across the
across the two tasks (e.g., in mean bias scores and/or predic-
tive validity). Importantly, any differences would be accom-
panied by greater clarity as to what functional dimension of
comparison drives such effects, thereby helping to link such
results directly with the domain-specific theories to which
they attempt to speak.
It is worth mentioning that, in taking such an approach, one
could seriously question the logic of attempting to develop a
procedure (e.g., to measure Battitudes,^ Bassociative strengths,^
or Brelational responding^) that is acontextual or Babsolute^ in
some sense as others have argued (see O’Shea, Watson, &
Brown, 2016). That is, we would argue that all measures of
so-called implicit attitudes are moderated to some extent by
contextual variables. As such, we suggest that it may be more
useful to attempt to harness rather than eliminate such sources of
contextual control in the service of meeting our analytic goals.
In closing, while we have focused on the question of
whether contrast category manipulations can influence behav-
ior on other trial types, it is also worth considering possible
reasons for the direction of the specific effect that was found.
The current results indicate that women were more strongly
dehumanized on the IRAP in the context of Binanimate
objects^ relative to Bmen.^ Intuitively, one might have expect-
ed the opposite pattern (i.e., that women would be humanized
when compared with objects). The reasons for this apparently
counterintuitive result are unclear at present. One possible
post hoc explanation is that the Gender IRAP employed two
immediately salient categories (i.e., male vs. female), whereas
the Agency IRAP employed a relatively clear category for two
trial types (i.e., female) and stimuli that were less clearly a
category for two other trial types (i.e., a list of inanimate ob-
jects). As such, the orthogonality of the categories within the
Gender IRAP may have made it easier to complete than the
Agency IRAP, thereby influencing the results. Indeed, a post
hoc analysis of the average reaction times on each measure
indicated that participants were significantly faster overall to
respond on the Gender IRAP (M=1561 ms, SD=171) than
the Agency IRAP (M=1824 ms, SD=282), t(40) =−3.66,
p< .001, Hedges’ gs=1.11. Additionally, it should be noted
that two of the Bhuman^ stimuli could be said to be stereo-
typed male traits (i.e., logic and rational). Thus, there may
have been a tendency to respond to Bwomen^ and Blogic^
with Bdifferent^ rather than Bsimilar,^ especially in a context
where there was a lack of orthogonality elsewhere in the task.
Regardless of how such variables impacted on the direction of
the effects observed in the current study, it is important to
remember that the contrast category did significantly impact
on the categories of interest across the two IRAPs.
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